

PARTICIPATION, TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN VILLAGE LAW IMPLEMENTATION

Baseline Findings from the Sentinel Villages Study

2018 The World Bank – Local Solutions to Poverty, Jakarta, Indonesia

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October 2015 – February 2016

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

APB Desa	: <i>Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Desa</i> (Village budget)
BPD	: <i>Badan Permusyawaratan Desa</i> (village council)
CDD	: Community-Driven Development
FGD	: Focus Group Discussion
KDP	: Kecamatan Development Program (<i>Program Pengembangan Kecamatan</i> , PPK)
LLI	: Local Level Institutions
Musdes	: <i>Musyawarah Desa</i> (village deliberation forums)
Musdus	: <i>Musyawarah Dusun</i> (hamlet deliberation forums)
Musrenbangdes	: <i>Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan Desa</i> (Village-level planning meetings)
PNPM	: <i>Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat</i> (National Program for Community Empowerment)
PSF	: PNPM Support Facility
RPJM Desa	: <i>Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Desa</i> (Village Mid-Term Plan)
RT	: <i>Rukun Tetangga</i> (neighborhood unit)
RKP Desa	: <i>Rencana Kerja Pemerintahan Desa</i> (Village Annual Work Plan)
RW	: <i>Rukun Warga</i> (community unit)
SV	: Sentinel Villages (Village Government and Community Empowerment Study)
VL	: Village Law



Abstract

Abstract

Can the Village Law improve socioeconomic conditions in Indonesia's villages through better participation and governance? This is the central question that the Sentinel Villages study sets out to answer. The study observes the first two years of Village Law implementation to assess villagers' participation, the transparency and accountability of village governments, and the influence of good governance principles on village decision-making processes for development investments. At the start of Village Law implementation, participation in village decision-making was still dominated by elites and men, particularly at village-level meetings, while sub-village- or even neighborhood-level meetings were more accessible to women and poorer people from the bottom 40 percent. Villagers tended not to participate largely because of the high opportunity costs and the perception that the discussions only concerned village government and community leaders. Being invited was less of

an issue because, even when they were invited, more than half of the villagers did not attend. Village heads also selectively invited members of the elite, community leaders and activists, and those whom they thought would be willing to speak and able to provide inputs. Village councils, which had not yet been formed in accordance with the Village Law, did not demonstrate their potential to improve villagers' engagement in decision-making and control over village governments. However, village activists' concerns about local issues were more in line with village households, and women activists were almost as vocal and active as men activists. Encouraging participation in sub-village meetings and promoting village activists to voice villagers' concerns in village meetings may be an effective way of offsetting the dominance of village governments and village elites.

Keywords: village law, village governance



1.

Background

Background

Law No. 6/2014 on Villages (“the Village Law”, or VL) provides opportunities to improve village governance in Indonesia by incorporating good governance principles of community participation, transparency and downward accountability, and providing additional resources and autonomy to villages. These principles have already been practised through community-driven development (CDD) projects for more than 15 years in villages across the country. The principles are based on the premise that empowering citizens to choose or demand the goods/services they need will improve their wellbeing.

CDD projects first started in Indonesia after the end of the New Order era. Under the New Order regime, villages were tightly controlled by higher levels of government that decided which development projects they could have. This highly top-down

approach often resulted in a mismatch between what was needed by the community and what was provided by the government, and villages had little if any control over their own development as they had few resources with which to manage development themselves. In the new circumstances following the end of the New Order era, CDD projects piloted through the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) aimed to provide communities with the opportunity to address their own development needs. This was achieved by providing space for communities to meet and propose their own priorities, and by providing the necessary funds and technical support to implement the proposals. To ensure that funds were received by communities in full and in good time, the projects had their own management and accountability mechanisms, and did not rely on the existing systems of village government.


Following the end of the New Order era, for a brief period Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Government enabled villagers to hold the village government accountable, and hence be more responsive to the needs of the community, by establishing an elected village council to represent the community. However, Law No. 22/1999 was short-lived and its replacement, Law No. 32/2004, vastly reduced downward accountability mechanisms by allowing village heads to appoint village council members themselves, giving more power to the village heads with almost no other village institutional control. This is the context in which CDD projects—merged into an umbrella program called the National Program for Community Empowerment (*Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat*, or PNPM) after 2007—operated during most of the projects’ lives. Because they had separate management and accountability systems, such projects had limited influence on how village government operated, despite having had a presence for more than a decade at the village level (Dharmawan, Dewayanti, & Nugraheni, 2014), (Syukri, Mawardi, & Akhmadi, 2013), (Woodhouse, 2012). Nonetheless, PNPM was successful in providing good quality and cost-effective village infrastructure, reducing poverty and improving access to services, with minimal leakages (PNPM Support Facility, 2014a), (Syukri, Akhmadi, Hastuti, Kartawijaya, & Kurniawan, 2014), (Syukri Mawardi, & Akhmadi, 2013), (Voss, 2013), (Voss, 2008). Some viewed PNPM as a cost-effective CDD tool that helped to shift more of the funds to the beneficiaries, rather than as a means of social transformation (Mansuri & Rao, 2013). The hope now is that, with the passage of the Village Law and the greater provision of funds and its stipulation of good governance practices, there will be a significant improvement in the quality and results of village development.





The VL's multiple accountability mechanisms include returning power to the revitalized village council (*Badan Permusyawaratan Desa*, or BPD) as community representatives, instituting village deliberation forums (*Musyawahar Desa*, or Musdes) to enhance general community participation, and providing transparency on government operations and reporting to district governments. However, given that many village governments are now managing increasingly significant financial resources with only limited capacity in good governance principles, concerns have been raised over the potential misuse of funds, the misalignment of priority development needs between village governments and the communities they serve, and the increasing exclusion of marginalized groups from the development process. Hence, it has become important to observe how these good governance principles are being practiced, especially in the early years of VL implementation.

This Sentinel Villages (SV) study started its baseline fieldwork with a qualitative component in 10 villages in September to October 2015, and the quantitative component in another 112 villages in the same districts in March to April 2016 (details on the methodology used are provided in Chapter 3). This report provides overview findings from the baseline study on participation, the transparency of information, and accountability mechanisms. For a more extensive report on the qualitative work, see Kurniawan, Sedyadi, Kartawijaya, Syukri, Bachtar, Diningrat & Alifia (2017).



2.

Objectives and Research Questions

Objectives and

Research Questions

The study tracks VL implementation progress in the first three years of the law's implementation (2015-2018) with the following objectives:¹

- 1) To examine whether VL implementation is following the stipulated principles of participation, transparency and accountability in village governance processes;
- 2) To observe whether VL implementation is leading to more responsive village government, as reflected in the decisions that correspond to community priorities; and
- 3) To examine whether the existence of local institutions (such as the BPD and/or *adat* councils) and village activists (such as former PNPM actors) influence the implementation of the VL.²

To examine the implementation of the VL, the study sets out to answer the following questions:

- 1) *To what extent are villages implementing the stipulated principles of participation, transparency and accountability?*
 - a. Are planning and implementation processes open to non-elites, including women, poor villagers and marginalized groups? Why or why not?
 - b. Are community members, including non-elites,

women, poor villagers and marginalized groups, informed about: (i) village government planning processes; (ii) village government decisions; and (iii) the implementation of projects supported through village funds? Why or why not?

- c. Is the community able to hold the village government to account for the use of village funds through mechanisms stipulated in the VL, such as the BPD and Musdes? Why or why not?
- 2) *Does implementing the principles of participation, transparency and accountability lead to village fund allocation that corresponds with the community's priorities?*
 - a. Are village funds allocated according to priorities that reflect the needs of non-elites, including those of women, poor villagers and marginalized groups? Why or why not?
 - b. Do community members, including non-elites, women, the poor and marginalized groups, perceive changes in their interactions with the village government after VL implementation? Why or why not?
- 3) *Do existing local institutions (such as the BPD and/or adat councils) and village activists (such as former PNPM actors) influence VL implementation? What role do they play, if any?*

¹The study has now been extended to 2018, one year longer than originally planned.

²At the time of the fieldwork, regulations on *adat* villages had not yet been established and none of the sampled villages had formally been declared an *adat* village. In the qualitative study, *adat* was still strong in community life but did not play a significant role in village government. *Adat* groups were treated similarly to other community groups. One village was known to have a separate *adat* organization to manage its *adat* forest, which was distinct from the village government. This created the potential for conflict between the two organizations. Further results from the research will be reported in the end-line study in 2018.



3.

Methodology and Locations

Methodology

and Locations

3.1. Methodology

The study employs both qualitative and quantitative methods to examine changes in how participation, transparency and accountability principles are being put into practice, what factors influence these practices, and how villagers and village governments both perceive these changes from their own perspectives. The qualitative method is used to obtain an in-depth understanding of the relationship between the various factors, while the quantitative method is used to illustrate the patterns of these practices, together with their origins and the perceptions of them among the community. Both components involve baseline and end-line fieldwork. During the fieldwork, the qualitative component required a field observer to be placed in each district to collect information on related issues of VL implementation.

The qualitative part of the study was conducted using various data-collection techniques, such as direct observation, focus group discussions (FGDs) and in-depth interviews. Direct observations were used to gain an understanding of the specific characteristics of the villages, including their geographical conditions and natural resources,

as well as to gain a better sense of how villagers interacted with each other and with the village government in daily life. Three types of FGDs were also conducted during the baseline fieldwork: (i) on village governance; (ii) on village institutions and key actors; and (iii) on the responsiveness of village governments. The first two FGDs were conducted separately for male and female participants, while the third FGD was mixed. Overall, over 400 villagers participated in the FGDs across all the study locations. In addition, various interviews were conducted with key informants from the district, sub-district and village levels, including interviews with marginalized groups, to gain information from various stakeholders involved in VL implementation on their experiences, challenges and expectations.

The quantitative part of the study surveyed over 4,000 respondents of both genders, including village heads, BPD heads and village activists in 112 villages (see 3.2 for details). The respondents were a mixture of household heads and members, village heads, hamlet heads, village council members/head, village activists, and health and education sector workers. The surveys asked questions to gain an understanding of these respondents' involvement in VL implementation, their experiences

and understanding of VL implementation, their satisfaction with the services and information, and their perceptions about their village's priority needs.

3.2. Site selection and sampling approach

The study was carried out in locations that provided a variety of characteristics of rural Indonesia that could have an influence on village governance in order to obtain a collection of detailed case studies. However, these locations were not intended to be representative of the whole country. Instead, they were limited to include resource-rich and resource-poor provinces, Java and off-Java, and strong and weak local (formal/state, community/*adat*/religion-based) institutions.

There are few accessible datasets from which the study could draw samples that included micro-data, such as the level of participation in village-level activities, and perceptions of transparency and accountability of village governments. PNPM

datasets only go down to the sub-district level. Given these constraints, the study used locations from the Local Level Institutions (LLI) studies, another longitudinal study conducted in 1996 (LLI1), 2000/01 (LLI2) and 2012 (LLI3). These studies sought to identify the preconditions for, and constraints on, local capacity (defined as the ability to resolve common problems collectively) and the extent to which state structures complemented or impeded communities' problem-solving efforts that fit the criteria as described in the methodology (poor and resource-rich, Java and off-Java, strong and weak local institutions). These provinces were Jambi, Central Java and East Nusa Tenggara (NTT). The LLI datasets provide additional advantages for the study site selection as: (i) they have data at three different points in time over the past two decades (LLI1 in 1996, LLI2 in 2001, and LLI3 in 2012) that reinforce the longitudinal nature of this proposed study; and (ii) they are the only datasets available that provide information on the key indicators that this study looks into, namely participation, transparency and accountability at the village level.

Table 1. Selected characteristics of the qualitative sites

District	Village ^a	Distance to subdistrict	Population size	Poverty rate ^b	APB Desa 2015 (Rp)
Ngada	Ndona	15 km	1,378	24.27	579,177,912
	Lekosoro	16 km	913	20.41	576,132,552
Wonogiri	Kalikromo	2 km	2,785	27.13	803,827,000
	Beral	8 km	3,366	8.48	1,104,514,000
Banyumas	Deling	3 km	4,836	18.73	939,912,188
	Karya Mukti	3 km	13,038	24.02	1,802,637,497
Batanghari	Tiang Barajo	15 km	1,965	9.23	856,953,280
	Kelok Sungai Besar	16 km	2,087	13.58	843,110,280
Merangin	Jembatan Rajo	3 km	1,261	3.21	383,213,333
	Seberang Sungai	4 km	755	42.54	375,451,431

Source: Village Profile and APB Desa.

a) All are pseudonyms;

b) For consistency across all sites data were obtained from SMERU's poverty and livelihood data map of 2010 at <http://www.indonesiapovertymap.org>

Hence, the study revisited five LLI districts: two in Jambi (Batanghari and Merangin), two in Central Java (Banyumas and Wonogiri) and one in NTT (Ngada). For the qualitative work, 10 villages were selected from a set of 20 villages visited during the third round of the LLI studies in 2012, using the following criteria:

- Variations in participation level in village development activities and perceptions of transparency and accountability (from LLI dataset);
- Variations in village capacity for collective action (from LLI dataset); and
- Variations in village potential, such as resources, access to infrastructure and access to markets (from *Potensi Desa*, or PODES).

For the quantitative component, initially the plan had been to pick 100 villages outside the qualitative study sites. The number of villages in each district was determined by the proportion of total villages in each district. However, in order to maintain the proportions, 12 villages were added in Merangin

and Ngada. For logistical reasons, four villages were visited in each sub-district. Adjustments were made to ensure that the number of villages per district was a multiple of four. The sub-districts, villages and hamlets—one in each village—were selected randomly. Based on the most recent list of households provided by the hamlet head, 20 households were selected randomly and in each household two adult respondents (a man and a woman) were interviewed.

Box 1. The total number of respondents was:

- 2,240 households, comprising 1,841 households represented by two respondents and 399 households by one respondent.
- 4,081 adult household member respondents, comprising 2,125 women and 1,956 men.
- 112 village heads.
- 112 BPD heads.
- 112 hamlet heads.
- 222 community activists, 224 health sector workers and 192 education sector workers.



4.

Conceptual Framework

Conceptual Framework

4.1. Participation

Participation is one of the key principles in the VL. Article 3 of the VL lists 13 principles as the basis for village management (*pengaturan desa*), one of which is participation. Participation in decision-making has been recognized as an important aspect in development programs in Indonesia, especially after years of experience in implementing community-based development programs such as the Kecamatan Development Program (*Program Pemberdayaan Kecamatan*, or PPK) and PNPM (Wetterberg, 2014). The underlying assumption is that opening decision-making processes to include a wide range of actors will lead to more broadly shared and sustainable development outcomes. Particularly in those contexts where non-elites have been previously excluded, the inclusion of the community's voice is expected to improve the village government's performance (Clearly, 2007), (Narayan, 2002).

Recent reviews of participatory approaches, however, show that participation does not always lead to better and more equitable outcomes.

While there have been some exhaustively cited successes [such as participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil (Baiocchi, 2003), but for more toned-down praise, see Boulding & Wampler, 2010], participatory projects often continue to favor elites who are “wealthier, more educated, of higher social status, male and more politically connected than non-participants” (Mansuri & Rao 2013:5), see also Bandiera and Levy (2011), and Dasgupta and Beard (2007). Participation may also inflict financial and social costs on poor and marginalized groups, and on women.³ Positive impacts for these groups are often limited or highly dependent on the context (Joshi, 2014), (Mansuri & Rao, 2013), (O'Meally, 2013).

Even in projects that make participation compulsory and protect the processes against the village government's (and the local elite's) intervention, such as PNPM, participation quality varies and confirms some of the concerns raised earlier. Data from PNPM Rural show that women and the poor had considerable involvement in the program, with women making up 45 percent of those engaged, and with 50 percent of participants categorized as poor. The poor were also heavily involved in

³ See Sambodho (a, forthcoming paper, as part of this study)

sub-project implementation (mainly construction work), with more than 70 percent of the workers for PNPM Rural infrastructure drawn from the poorest segments of the village (Pokja Pengendali PNPM, 2012). However, there are also reports that women and the poor rarely participated in decision-making, which remained dominated by local elites (Neil, 2013). Meanwhile, marginalized groups usually remained excluded from participation (Syukri et al., 2013), (AKATIGA, 2012), (AKATIGA, 2010), and there was limited citizen empowerment and ownership in remote and marginal areas of the poorest regions (PSF, 2015), (Neil, 2013). Nonetheless, in terms of outcomes of the participation process, the majority of PNPM beneficiaries (around 90 percent)—regardless of gender or poverty level—agreed that they had benefited from the investments in PNPM block grants (PNPM beneficiary surveys, 2012 and 2015).

Elite capture certainly exists but is limited, especially among the informal leaders (*vis-à-vis* those in formal leadership positions in the village), and so are the welfare losses it creates (Alatas, et al., 2013). Another study distinguishes further between elite control (over decision-making) and elite capture (of the benefits), and finds that elites behave differently in different contexts—“not all elites who had power were corrupt” and, in cases where they controlled the decisions, the benefits still went to the most deserving groups (Dasgupta and Beard, 2007:244; see also World Bank, 2017).

There is a need to capitalize on informal leaders and village activists, who are generally (but by no means always) among the better off in the village.⁴ A village governance project in Zimbabwe experimented in utilizing these informal leaders to create horizontal pressure, arguing that they create leadership competition and increase monitoring, among others (Baldwin, Muyengwa, & Mvukiyehe, 2017).

This horizontal pressure is needed given that the pressures from above are not always effective or available, and neither are the pressures from below, as is also found in villages in Indonesia (Wetterberg, Jellema, & Dharmawan, 2014).

Using this knowledge of participation, this baseline study looks at who participates in the decision-making process and the implementation of village projects funded by the significant increase in village budgets, how they participate, and their perceptions of the benefits. In particular, the study discusses the following areas:

- *Musdes*: Village deliberation forums figure prominently in the VL as a means of involving the community to consider strategic matters in village government (Article 54). Outcomes of these deliberations should be referenced by the village government in the execution of their duties (elucidation of Article 54), making the *Musdes* an important decision-making body.
- *Musyawaharah Dusun* (*Musdus*): Usually hamlet deliberation forums precede and feed into the village forums. This is the forum that is physically closest to the villagers and is attended by close neighbors, and we compare the *Musdus* with the *Musdes*.
- *Facilitators*: Many past CDD projects were highly reliant on facilitators in order to ensure that the participatory principles were followed, bringing different groups of people together and bridging them to outside resources. The VL also provides strong support for facilitation, both from the community, as well as externally.⁵
- *Participation in project implementation*: The VL specifies that the village community should be involved in implementing development projects included in the village’s annual work plan (Article 81).

⁴ Following a study on PNPM marginalized groups, we define village activists as those with knowledge of government projects and who use the knowledge to be involved in later projects. They are not village government officials but have close relations with government officials and they are not necessarily the village wealthy. These activists include the cadres of health centers, government-led women’s groups, and farmers’ groups (AKATIGA, 2010).

⁵ At the time of the data collection, most facilitators were not available for various reasons. We will collect data on them at the end-line survey and in between (qualitatively).

4.2. Transparency and accountability

Transparency is intended to drive accountability, as citizens can use the disclosed information to voice their concerns over budget discrepancies or unfulfilled development plans. While sharing information (on government decisions, budgets, or service standards, for example) is not enough on its own to ensure that the state is complying with its stated priorities, it does nonetheless give citizens the means to hold state actors to account (Grindle, 2007). Fox (2007) conceptualizes a spectrum ranging from transparency to accountability. By participating in decision-making, citizens may gain the right to question the state's past performance, which produces a soft version of accountability. However, "answerability without consequences falls short of accountability" (Fox, 2007:668). It is only when officials and providers face "sanctions with teeth" (Joshi 2014:26) for shortcomings in the fulfillment of their responsibilities that hard accountability is evident. In short, information disclosure is an important element to push for accountability, but accountability is effective only when it is backed up by "sanctions with teeth", when appropriate.

Such hard accountability has been proven to be effective in Indonesia, once again referring to the country's major CDD project, PNPM, through its internal and external financial monitoring that led to a low corruption level of below 1 percent in its overall disbursements (PSF, 2014b), (Woodhouse, 2012), (McLaughlin, Satu, & Hoppe, 2007). The VL aims to emulate this oversight for accountability through "a threefold accountability structure: horizontally, to an empowered BPD; downward, to the public, through a newly introduced village assembly; and upward, to the district government" (Antlov, Wetterberg, & Dharmawan, 2016). The community can solicit and receive information from the village government to monitor its activities. However, to be able to exercise the demand for

accountability, villagers need a support system through facilitation, as recognized in the Village Law. Apart from the delayed empowerment of the BPD, facilitation is largely unavailable in many villages.

The VL builds on PNPM's transparency and accountability mechanisms. In particular, it stipulates community monitoring by ensuring that the community can solicit and receive information from the village government, as well as oversee activities related to governance, development implementation, guidance and community empowerment (Article 68). In addition, there is a specific article regarding the right to monitor development plans and activities (Article 82). The same article also obligates the village government to report on planning and implementation of the RPJM Desa and APB Desa at least annually through the Musdes.

In addition, the VL goes beyond PNPM's accountability mechanisms by strengthening the BPD. The VL and associated legislation consistently state that the BPD must be chosen democratically, which is an important shift toward re-establishing the body's independence from the village head (as per Law No. 32/2004). Furthermore, the BPD's functions include overseeing and soliciting information from the village government, proposing draft village regulations, channeling community aspirations, and following democratic principles and gender equity (Articles 55, 61-63). The BPD should also play an important role in village planning, as the organizer of the Musdes.

With the incorporation of such good governance principles (albeit limited, i.e., mostly upward accountability), which was not the case in the past, it will be interesting to see whether or not village governments will implement these legal requirements (and how they do so), and to measure the impacts on villagers' levels of satisfaction and wellbeing.



5.

Key Baseline Findings

Key Baseline

Findings

In this study, we hypothesize that village governance—including participation, transparency and accountability—will improve once the BPD and facilitators are active in providing checks and balances, and promoting good governance, referring to the findings of the LLI studies (Wetterberg et al., 2014). The baseline data for this report were collected at the start of VL implementation, when some of the key regulations and mechanisms were not yet in place, such as those on BPD selection and the BPD’s role and responsibilities. When the survey was conducted, the BPD had not yet been modeled in accordance with the VL and, in many villages, facilitators were also not in place. In this context, the baseline study was able to capture the conditions before the VL was fully implemented. We expect that, as VL implementation continues, we should be able to see differences in the end-line study (to be fielded in early 2018) to answer all three research questions of this study. In this baseline report, we mainly answer the first research question and some of the third question, to present a portrait of governance in village development activities.⁶

5.1. Participation in village planning and project implementation

In broad terms, the baseline survey categorizes two types of participation: participation in implementing development activities/projects (usually in the form of contribution of labor) and participation in planning and budgeting processes (or decision-making) in village and hamlet meetings. **Participation in decision-making meetings was generally lower and less inclusive than in implementing activities (especially contributing labor), which were more inclusive—by gender, welfare group and district.** Construction activities, especially those in villagers’ own neighborhoods or hamlets, were known to 84.7 percent of the respondents.⁷ About two-thirds of them (66.4 percent) said that they had been involved in these activities during the past two years (**Table 2**). Ngada and Wonogiri topped the list. The most common form of involvement was in labor provision, either for free or for pay (85.7 percent), in which villagers, mostly men (97.4 percent men vs 70.4 percent women), work to build, improve and maintain local infrastructure, such as village roads,

⁶ See Kurniawan et al. (2017) on the qualitative baseline report for more wide-ranging discussions

⁷ All figures in this report are weighted (see technical notes in Annex 7).

trenches and local irrigation channels. With prior collective agreement, they could also forgo their wages, either partially or in full, as their contribution toward expanding the size of the project. Donating money, the second-most-common form of participation, was much lower (33.3 percent). So were other forms of participation, such as donating building materials (3.1 percent) and providing land (2.5 percent). Labor appeared to be most readily available form of contribution.

Participation in decision-making on development plans is observed, but to a lesser degree than participation in labor. Participation, as the qualitative study found, took place mostly during the compilation of the village’s mid-term plan (RPJM Desa), which was developed during the last year of PNPM (2014) and hence was facilitated by PNPM facilitators. The process started at the RT- or hamlet-level discussions and these were well attended. Once the RPJM Desa had been issued, villagers’ participation decreased, as discussions of the annual plan were more limited to the village leaders (including the RT heads) and community figures. Of our five districts, the survey shows that Ngada had the highest participation rate, more than double that of Batanghari, which came second (**Figure 1**). The performances of Ngada and Batanghari,

in particular, were driven by specific policies/ programs of the district governments. Ngada was able to maintain its high participation rate through its PNPM-like district program, known as *Pelangi Desa*, which started before the end of PNPM and continues operating to date. In this sense, the PNPM model has never really disappeared in this district. Batanghari followed a different path to encourage participation. There the district government provided funds in *Alokasi Dana Desa* (transfers from the district government) for transportation allowances for villages to hold village-level planning meetings (*Musrenbangdes*, or *Musdes*) for up to 70 participants.

Figure 1. Participation rate in village and hamlet level meetings by district




Table 2. Participation in infrastructure construction activities

Variable	All obs	Districts					F-test
		Merangin	Batanghari	Banyumas	Wonogiri	Ngada	
Participated in local infrastructure activities	66.4 3,365	28.7 602	18.4 377	65.7 1,005	79.6 852	84.4 529	121.2 **
Forms of villagers participation:							
- Labor/work	85.7	84.8	96.6	80.6	91.1	96.5	3.9 **
- Money	33.3	17.6	0.0	36.2	31.8	32.5	66.9 **
- Materials	3.1	7.9	0.9	3.2	2.4	6.8	1.1
- Land	2.5	8.4	3.4	3.7	0.5	1.4	1.9
	2,065	166	67	683	700	449	

Notes: **, * F-test on the equality of means across kabupaten is statistically significant at 5 and 10 per cent, respectively

In general, hamlet meetings were more popular than village meetings, as the hamlet is in the closest proximity to where villagers live. Around 27 percent of respondents attended hamlet-level meetings, while only 16 percent attended village-level meetings in the past year. Wonogiri stood out as the second-highest district (after Ngada), with 44.4 percent of the villagers participating in hamlets meetings—four times higher than the attendance rate at village meetings. This district has a long tradition of community gatherings held every 35 days, known as *selapanan*, to discuss various hamlet issues—often preceded by Quran recitals/prayers and *arisan dusun* (hamlet-level rotating funds). Men and women held separate *selapanan* at different times. When excluding both Ngada and Wonogiri, which increased the overall participation rate, the participation rate at hamlet meetings drops to only 15.9 percent. Similarly, excluding Ngada drove down the participation rate of village meetings to 14.2 percent. Only 7.9 percent of respondents stated that they had attended both meetings. In Banyumas, where villages have a much larger population size (**Table 1**), meetings at sub-hamlet or neighborhood level (RT/RW), attracted more participants (as observed later), which might explain low attendance rates at village and hamlet levels.

At first, being invited appeared to be an important factor that led villagers to attend village meetings, as 81.7 percent of the attendees said they had been invited. However, only 44 percent of village heads sent out invitations to villagers to discuss the village annual work plan (RKP Desa). An even lower proportion of village heads (36 percent) invited villagers to the annual budget (APB Desa) discussion, which was considered to be more technical and complicated. **Invitations turned out to be given selectively, indicating that village meetings were not equally open to all villagers.** Village governments limited not only the number of invitees but also whom they invited, and justified their actions based on: (i) whether villagers were already appropriately represented by their hamlet heads, community and/or religious leaders in the meetings; (ii) whether there was a meeting venue

large enough to accommodate all or a large number of villagers; and (iii) whether villagers were too busy to participate. No specific efforts were made to encourage poor or marginalized groups to participate in such meetings.

Only in some villages were invitations given to all villagers through public announcements. In Ngada, for example, meetings were mostly open to the public: all village heads claimed that they invited everybody to the village annual planning and budget meetings. Usually, the invitations were announced after Sunday mass in church. A similar process took place in Merangin, as observed in one village (Seberang Sungai) in the qualitative study. Here, no formal invitation was issued, as upcoming meetings were announced over the mosque's speakers, serving as an open invitation to all. But unlike Ngada, only a few people came to meetings and those who did were mostly men. People generally said they were too busy working and were not willing to incur the opportunity costs of attending. Open information by itself is not sufficient to bring people to meetings.

A closer look at the data indicates that those being invited to village meetings, compared with those who were not invited, comprised the better off in the community, those active in organizations, and those who had a positive opinion of the village government. They comprised 38 percent of the villagers. These participants were more likely to be men, currently working, of the majority ethnic group, active in local organizations and/or political parties, and had higher educational attainment (see **Annex 1**). In addition, participants perceived the village leadership positively—that the village head, hamlet head and BPD head were reliable in planning the village development and capable of executing the plans. Interestingly, those who had submitted complaints or reported problems (9 percent of respondents)—not necessarily critical of the village government—were also more likely to be invited to meetings. The village heads confirmed that they invited villagers who they felt actively voiced their concerns or provided input to the village government, actively participated in

village activities and provided assistance for such events. This deliberate choice by village heads indicated that they valued input from those who had concerns over village affairs or were more willing to participate in village activities. The same reasoning was confirmed by the qualitative study. The village heads not only looked for input, but were also trying to reduce opposition and avoid conflicts.

Conversely, the poor, women, and those who were less active, were less likely to be invited and to attend village meetings.⁸ These findings were consistent with the results of the LLI3 survey in 2012, indicating that there was hardly any change between the two surveys (Wetterberg et al., 2014). Our present survey data show (**Annex 2**) that attendance was also much less likely among women. Comparing attendance at village and hamlet meetings, the characteristics were similar except in their magnitude, indicating that hamlet meetings seemed to be more “friendly” to people with no formal education. Household members from the bottom 40 percent of the welfare distribution were also less likely to come to village meetings, while attendance at hamlet meetings did not seem

to differentiate households by welfare distribution (see below). In addition, the study findings show that in comparison to participating respondents, the non-participating groups usually had a lower opinion of the village government in three areas: (i) the village government’s reliability in making and executing development plans; (ii) the village government’s reliability in providing access to information; and (iii) perceived efforts by the village government to resolve villagers’ daily problems and perceived handling of their complaints.⁹ Villagers will not be motivated to participate if they think that village government is not reliable or able to respond to their needs (Sambodho, a, forthcoming).

Where this responsiveness is lacking participation is seen by villagers as being a poor use of their time.

Unlike village meetings, hamlet meetings seem to be more broadly attended by those who are wealthier and people from the bottom 40 percent.

There was no significant difference of likelihood to participate in hamlet meetings across wealth quintiles. Given the proximity of hamlets to villagers’ places of residence, it was easier for villagers to participate in hamlet-level activities, including

Table 3. Perceptions toward village heads and hamlet heads (%)

	All obs	District					F-test
		Merangin	Batanghari	Banyumas	Wonogiri	Ngada	
Felt that [...] is reliable to make development plans							
- Village Head	74.9	50.8	45.2	75.8	83.8	74.5	18.4 **
- Hamlet Head	78.5	62.9	61.8	76.0	89.0	75.3	14.7 **
- BPD	58.3	58.3	60.0	60.2	53.8	72.3	2.2
- PNPM Kecamatan facilitators	49.0	30.6	23.1	54.9	47.9	50.7	25.2 **
Felt that [...] is reliable to implement development							
- Village Head	77.5	56.5	52.3	78.0	85.9	76.2	17.0 **
- Hamlet Head	80.8	67.0	65.5	79.1	89.6	76.9	13.1 **
- BPD	59.0	58.2	61.8	61.1	54.2	72.3	2.1
- PNPM Kecamatan facilitators	48.8	30.9	22.2	54.7	47.6	50.2	25.3 **
Observations	4,081	891	456	1,155	989	590	

Notes: all figures are in percentage; ** statistically significant at 5 percent; * statistically significant at 10 percent

⁸ A small fraction of villagers (158 respondents) came to village meetings without invitation. They represented 7 percent of the uninvited (2,390 respondents).

⁹ For more discussions on the non-participating villagers, see Sambodho (a, forthcoming).

meetings in the evening. This is an indication that the hamlet could be the locus where most participation from villagers can be expected. In addition, more villagers viewed hamlet heads as being reliable as opposed to village heads in four out of five districts (Table 3). This difference is statistically significant.

From the perspective of villagers, they face both external and internal barriers that prevent them from participating in meetings. Not being invited (an external barrier) was the most cited reason (70.1 percent), followed by internal barriers: villagers felt the meetings were irrelevant to them (17.1 percent),¹⁰ or they were too busy to attend (17.1 percent) (see Annex 3 for details). Women faced more internal barriers. They were less likely to claim that they were not invited, but more likely to say that they were too busy, or that the meetings were irrelevant to them. This was the opposite among the poor (bottom 40 percent), who faced more external barriers. They were more likely to say that they did not go to meetings because they were not invited and less likely to claim that they were too busy.

However, in general not being invited turned out to be less of a barrier to meeting attendance.

When asked to provide motivations for attending future village meetings, most villagers said that they would attend such meetings upon invitation (76 percent) but, as shown in Seberang Sungai and mentioned earlier, open invitations did not necessarily bring people to the meetings. In fact, more than half of the invitees did not attend the meetings (Annex 1), showing the unpopularity of such meetings. And 11.5 percent stated that they would attend if attendance were made mandatory by village authorities.

A closer examination of various other factors that may have influenced villagers’ attendance indicates there were some significant differences between men and women.

For men, welfare seemed to influence their attendance positively—the richer they were, the higher the likelihood that they attended village meetings (Annex 4). For women, their domestic role of taking care of toddlers (age 0-4) contributed to their decisions to attend or not to attend village meetings. This was not the case for men.

Figure 2. Type of engagement during village meetings (%)





Figure 3. Type of engagement during hamlet meetings (%)



¹⁰ Some of the reasons respondents gave in considering the meetings irrelevant to them included: (i) meetings were village government matters, (ii) meetings were for men, and (iii) meetings had no benefits for them.

In both village and hamlet meetings, men were more engaged than women in the discussions, but the gap is generally closer in hamlet meetings (except in voting) even when men still dominate the attendance. The three top types of engagement participants cited were: (i) voting on decision-making (39.9 percent); (ii) providing suggestions (39.1 percent); and (iii) expressing opinions or passing judgment (38.3 percent) (**Figures 2 and 3**). It was men (as household heads) who usually attended the meetings to represent their households. When women attended, they were often discouraged from speaking up or, if they did, they were often taunted about being “rebellious” or “troublesome”, as shown in the qualitative study in Wonogiri. Most of the time women attended the women-only neighborhood or hamlet meetings to discuss day-to-day topics such as *arisan* (rotating fund) and weekly praying/Quran reciting group.

The level of previous experience of the village leadership helps to drive villagers’ participation.¹¹

Participation was statistically significantly higher in villages in which village heads and at least half of their staff were former PNPM actors (**Table 4**). Even just the fact that the village head had had previous PNPM experience helped to increase participation in village meetings. Also, if the village head had participated in VL-related training, his/her villagers were 7.3 percent more likely to participate in village meetings. The length of tenure, of at least three years, was also positively associated with participation in hamlet meetings, as well as involvement in local infrastructure work.

In addition, the experience of the BPD—as the other branch of village leadership—seems to encourage participation, especially on infrastructure work. Having a head of the BPD who was 50+ years old or who had been residing in the village for more than 40 years led to higher involvement by villagers in local infrastructure work (19 percent and 11.3 percent, respectively) as shown in **Table 5**.

Table 4. Village heads’ previous experience and villagers’ participation

Villagers participated in	All obs	VH has 3+ yr tenure			VH and at least half of Village apparatus are former PNPM actors			Village Head: former PNPM actor			Village Head: has attended training(s) related to VL		
		Yes	No	Difference	Yes	No	Difference	Yes	No	Difference	Yes	No	Difference
Village meetings	23.7	27.6	21.9	5.7	38.2	22.3	15.9 **	31.7	21.3	10.4 **	24.5	17.2	7.3 *
Hamlet meetings	30.6	40.1	26.1	13.9 **	43.7	29.3	14.3	34.9	29.3	5.6	31.2	25.8	5.3
Infrastructure work	60.3	67.6	56.8	10.8 **	71.6	59.2	12.4 **	61.8	59.8	1.9	60.8	55.8	4.9
Observations	112	36	76		10	102		27	85		100	12	

Notes: all figures are in percentage; ** statistically significant at 5 percent; * statistically significant at 10 percent

Table 5. BPD’s profiles and villagers’ participation

Villagers participated in	All obs	BPD Head: age 50+ yrs			BPD Head: has resided in village 40+ yrs		
		Yes	No	Difference	Yes	No	Difference
Village meetings	23.7	23.1	24.3	-1.2	20.0	26.4	-6.3
Hamlet meetings	30.6	34.3	27.2	7.1	33.5	28.6	4.9
Infrastructure work	60.3	70.1	51.1	19.0 **	66.9	55.6	11.3 **
Observations	112	53	59		47	65	

Notes: all figures are in percentage; ** statistically significant at 5 percent; * statistically significant at 10 percent

¹¹ We collapsed villagers’ participation at the village level and associate it with village head, village apparatus and BPD characteristics. The latter includes gender, age, education, tenure and experience with PNPM of the respective village governance actors, as well as whether the BPD was directly elected and active in undertaking its tasks and responsibilities.

5.2. Transparency

Overall, less than half of all villagers were aware of village programs, while a much lower proportion (10 percent) claimed to have knowledge of the use of village funds, paralleling villagers' involvement in planning and budget discussions. Ngada noticeably remained at the top in both cases (**Figure 4**). Villagers in Ngada claimed to have the highest knowledge, while respondents in Batanghari had the least knowledge, although Batanghari (with Merangin) had the second-highest participation rate at village meetings, where presumably information was shared (**Figure 1**).¹² These different directions of participation in deliberative meetings and of knowledge about village programs and funds, particularly in Batanghari, may indicate different levels of interest and the limitations of information-sharing, as discussed later in this section.

In contrast, but as expected, villagers knew more about their hamlet activities than those outside their hamlets (village activities). More than 80 percent of survey respondents stated that they knew of, and participated in, local infrastructure activities funded by the village government in their respective hamlets during the past two years. However, only 47.8 percent of respondents claimed


to know village programs/activities implemented outside their hamlet (**Figure 4**). This higher level of knowledge concerning their own hamlets is another indication of villagers' interest, as also illustrated by their greater participation in hamlet-level meetings.

The characteristics of villagers who are more likely to be aware of village programs and finances are similar to those who are more likely to participate in meetings. Villagers attending meetings were more likely to have higher educational attainment, be currently working, come from the ethnic majority group, and be active in local organizations and political parties (**Annex 5**). They were also more likely to attend village and/or hamlet meetings, express concerns to the village government, and have a higher opinion of the village government's reliability in planning and implementing village development activities. Similarly, those who were less likely to be aware of village programs and the use of village funds were women, members of female-headed households, and those in the bottom 40 percent of the welfare distribution.

Almost all village heads, however, claim to have socialized their village plans and fund use, but mainly to selected groups (e.g., the BPD, hamlet and RT/RW heads, and other community leaders).

The information actually disseminated to the public was much lower than claimed by village heads (99.4 vs 75 percent on village plans, and 96 vs 68.2 percent on the use of village funds), as shown in **Table 6**. Batanghari and Ngada took turns to top the list in actual dissemination, while Merangin and Wonogiri were bottom for information on village plans and use of village funds. What villagers ended up receiving was even lower, as shown earlier in **Figure 4**, although the top three media that villagers and village heads liked concurred (**Table 7**). Village heads' other preferences of sharing information in writing (through brochures and, at a much lower rate, information boards) turned out to be less popular with the villagers, which might influence the effectiveness of the dissemination.

Figure 4. Villagers' awareness of village programs and the use of village funds



¹² In our survey, the extremely low rates were mostly in Batanghari and Merangin. There were four villages (all of them are in Merangin) where less than 10 percent of respondents knew about their village programs. In 14 villages respondents had zero knowledge of village fund use. Seven of these villages were in Merangin, five in Batanghari, and one village each in Banyumas and Wonogiri.

Villagers turned out to want to hear different kinds of information. Village programs only ranked third in terms of the kind of information that villagers wanted to hear (33.7 percent), as shown in **Table 8**. The first and second kinds of information most sought after were aid programs (63.4 percent) and implementation activities (45.3 percent). These kinds of information were in line with the information that village heads wanted to share with villagers, with a slightly different order. More than 75 percent of village heads stated that they would like villagers to have more information on the implementation of activities (84 percent), village programs (78.1 percent), and aid programs (76.9 percent). Village heads wanted villagers to know about activity implementation largely because this was when villagers were expected to contribute or share their

labor. Information on village finances ranked fourth for village heads to share (58.6 percent) and also for villagers to want to know about (26 percent). **Both wanted to share and to hear about the same issues, but interest in village finances was much lower, both in terms of wanting to share the information by village heads, but particularly in terms of villagers wanting to learn about the information.** Hence, the low level of villagers' awareness on village finances (**Figure 4**).

Our qualitative study provided some insight into the main issues concerning information. Village heads did not proactively disseminate information to villagers, although neither did they prevent villagers from obtaining it. Village heads claimed that they were happy to share information should villagers

Table 6. Village heads' perceptions of information needed by villagers

	All obs	District					F-test
		Merangin	Batanghari	Banyumas	Wonogiri	Ngada	
VH claimed to have announced Village Programs	99.4	97.3	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	1.0
<i>Observations</i>	112	24	12	32	28	16	
VH actually announced it to general public	75.0	51.8	100.0	85.1	64.3	87.2	10.8 **
<i>Observations</i>	111	23	12	32	28	16	
VH claimed to have announced Village Funds Use	96.0	90.2	90.3	100.0	95.4	100.0	1.3
<i>Observations</i>	112	24	12	32	28	16	
VH actually announced it to general public	68.2	49.5	83.9	82.4	46.1	86.7	4.9 **
<i>Observations</i>	107	21	11	32	27	16	

Notes: all figures are in percentage; ** statistically significant at 5 percent; * statistically significant at 10 percent

Table 7. Types of information villagers most often requested

Information dissemination media:	All Observations		Merangin		Batanghari		Banyumas		Wonogiri		Ngada	
	Villagers needs	VH view	Villagers needs	VH view	Villagers needs	VH view	Villagers needs	VH view	Villagers needs	VH view	Villagers needs	VH view
Special meetings (vilage, hamlet, RT/RW)	69.7	87.2	57.6	56.3	72.2	84.7	70.9	96.1	70.6	100	76.6	93.4
Special meetings (prayer group, etc.)	20.8	34.6	30.3	56.3	55.2	70.8	17.7	31.4	19.6	7.9	6.9	30.6
Information board at VH office	3.7	9.8	6.5	8.5	7.0	15.3	3.1	2.1	3.6	18.9	2.6	11.2
Village electronic media/website	1.6	2.6	0.2	5.8	0.0	0.0	1.3	4.1	3.4	0.0	1.0	0.0
Brochure/invitation/pamphlet	4.4	12.0	6.6	8.0	1.5	0.0	4.5	11.6	3.4	17.1	5.2	18.4
Community radio	0.0	0.7	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.1	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0
Announcement VH Office/ Mosque/Church	4.2	17.5	21.6	74.6	6.7	4.9	2.4	0.0	0.7	0.0	2.8	10.2
Verbal from Village apparatus	24.9	32.8	24.0	26.8	28	75	21.5	27.9	30.8	19.3	38.2	49.0
Verbal from community/religious leaders	1.0	5.4	0.8	5.8	0.2	25.7	1.2	0.0	0.6	7.9	0.7	0.0
<i>Observations</i>	2,757	112	644	24	350	12	845	32	468	28	450	16

Notes: all figures are in percentage; ** statistically significant at 5 percent; * statistically significant at 10 percent

ask for it. However, no effort was made to institute any systematic mechanism to channel information to villagers. Village heads often mentioned that they relied upon, or more likely assumed, that hamlet or neighborhood heads disseminated information on village development to villagers. However, the hamlet or neighborhood heads were not required to report information back to villagers. Only in one village in Ngada were village heads required to report construction plans and budget details to the community before infrastructure projects started, and this was more for the purpose of calculating the number of man-days the community needed to provide to participate in the construction, as opposed to simply informing the villagers.

The survey data also indicate that villagers themselves do not appear keen on obtaining information on village affairs. More than one-third of respondents—with Wonogiri at the top (54.6 percent)—stated that they had no interest in learning about village-related information (**Table 9**). These respondents belonged to the same group as those who were not participating in meetings and who had little awareness of village programs/finances, namely women, those with lower educational attainment, members of female-headed households, and less well-endowed villagers. Those who were older and had lived longer in the village also had a greater likelihood of not wanting to know about village-related information. Qualitative findings

Table 8. Village heads' perceived information needed and types of information most often requested by villagers

Information dissemination media: Villagers vs. Village Heads	All Observations		Merangin		Batanghari		Banyumas		Wonogiri		Ngada	
	Villagers needs	VH view	Villagers needs	VH view	Villagers needs	VH view	Villagers needs	VH view	Villagers needs	VH view	Villagers needs	VH view
Type of information:												
- Village program	33.7	78.1	34.5	80.4	44.8	80.6	26.7	74.0	43.8	71.8	62.3	93.4
- Village funds use/ village financial condition	26.0	58.6	31.5	77.7	33.9	41.0	25.1	62.8	21.6	33.2	43.7	74.0
- Implementation of village programs	45.3	84.0	45.3	87.1	42.4	79.9	48.2	84.3	36.0	72.9	61.6	100.0
- Assistance programs	63.4	76.9	77.3	82.1	90.3	70.1	63.8	81.8	49.0	58.2	74.6	93.4
- National/religious festivities/ events	6.3	30.2	12.0	47.8	2.2	19.4	8.0	39.3	0.7	12.9	6.6	18.4
- Other information	8.8	19.5	4.7	0	0.2	4.9	9.4	23.1	11.2	46.1	5.8	5.1

Notes: all figures are in percentage; ** statistically significant at 5 percent; * statistically significant at 10 percent

Table 9. Subjects of interest and villagers' characteristics

Types of information villagers most often requested	All obs	Gender			District					
		Women	Men	Difference	Merangin	Batanghari	Banyumas	Wonogiri	Ngada	
Villagers <i>do not want</i> any village information	36.4	42.1	30.3	11.8 **	28.9	22.3	28.0	54.6	54.6	
Observations	4,081	2,125	1,956		891	456	1,155	989	989	
Among villagers who seek information, they are seeking information on:										
- Village program	33.7	29.6	37.3	-7.6 **	34.5	44.8	26.7	43.8	62.3	
- Village funds use/village financial condition	26.0	18.5	32.8	-14.4 **	31.5	33.9	25.1	21.6	43.7	
- Implementation of village programs	45.3	36.4	53.3	-16.9 **	45.3	42.4	48.2	36.0	61.6	
- Assistance programs	63.4	68.3	59.1	9.2 **	77.3	90.3	63.8	49.0	74.6	
- National/religious festivities/events	6.3	6.4	6.3	0.0	12.0	2.2	8.0	0.7	6.6	
- Other information	8.8	8.9	8.6	0.3	4.7	0.2	9.4	11.2	5.8	
Observations	2,757	1,310	1,447		644	350	845	468	450	

Notes: all figures are in percentage; ** statistically significant at 5 percent; * statistically significant at 10 percent

also showed that villagers were often not keen to find out information about village development. As long as villagers knew what was being built in their neighborhood or hamlet, they were satisfied. Villagers also indicated that they did not want to know too much detail on village budgets, citing that this was “the business of the village government”.

As in participation and awareness about village programs and finances, men and the better-off are more likely to have an interest in soliciting information than women and the poor, aggravating the disadvantages of the latter (Annex 5). However, unlike in participation, those who already had positive views of their village head and hamlet head (being reliable in making plans and executing them) tended to have little interest in learning more information about their village (Annex 6). They may have already felt satisfied with their village leader’s performance and were unwilling to ask further questions. Meanwhile, the inclination was different when they thought their BPD head was reliable. This group wanted to learn more about village affairs. The different correlations between a positive view toward village and hamlet heads and low interest in village information on one hand, and the a positive view toward BPD heads and high interest in village information on the other hand, need to be explored further in the end-line study.

Similar to participation, the experience of village leaderships is positively correlated with villagers’ awareness of village programs and the use of village funds. Villagers residing in villages with a village head who had three or more years of tenure reported 4 percent higher awareness of the use of village funds than those living in villages where the village head had less than three years of tenure. In addition, having a BPD head who was older also led to higher villagers’ awareness of funds use (nearly 5 percent) and satisfaction with the provision of information (nearly 7 percent). Village heads and staff with previous experience of PNPM also correlated with higher levels of satisfaction among villagers on the information provided by the village government (Table 10).

Village heads’ proactivity in disseminating information appears to have no effect on villagers’ knowledge or awareness. Around 75 percent village heads announced village programs to the public, while 68 percent announced the use of village funds (Table 6). However, these efforts did not influence villagers’ awareness of village programs or the use of village funds. Furthermore, villagers’ level of satisfaction with the provision of information in general (i.e., not only information specific to village programs and/or the use of village funds) was not influenced by village heads’ dissemination efforts (Table 11).

Table 10. BPD members’ previous experience and their direct election, and villagers’ awareness

	All obs	BPD Head: age 50+ yrs			Village Head is former PNPM actor			VH and at least half of Village Apparatus are former PNPM actors			Village Head: tenure 3+ yrs		
		Yes	No	Difference	Yes	No	Difference	Yes	No	Difference	Yes	No	Difference
Villagers are:													
Aware of village programs	49.0	54.1	44.2	9.9 **	59.2	48.0	11.2 *	59.2	48.0	11.2 *	51.4	47.8	3.6
Aware of village funds use	11.3	13.7	9.0	4.6 *	14.4	11.0	3.5	11.0	3.5	3.5	14.0	10.0	4.0 *
Satisfied with information from Village Government	43.6	47.1	40.3	6.8 *	53.5	42.6	10.9 **	42.6	10.9	10.9 **	45.3	42.8	2.5
Observations	112	53	59		10	102		10	102		36	76	

Notes: all figures are in percentage; ** statistically significant at 5 percent; * statistically significant at 10 percent

In summary, a couple of factors influence villagers' awareness of information. First, the characteristics of both the village head and the villagers—village heads with specific experience are likely more proactive in sharing information, while villagers of higher socioeconomic status are more likely to receive the information. Second, more respected village leaders (i.e., older leaders) lead to higher villagers' participation and awareness. In terms of interest in the information, villagers show much lower interest in village finance than village heads' claimed was disseminated on the same topic.

5.3. Responsiveness and accountability

In addition to planning and executing village programs, village governments are also expected to respond to other priority problems that villagers claim to be facing. Problems that respondents cited included inadequate roads/infrastructure, crop failure and high unemployment rates (Table 12). In almost all cases, there were more respondents in Ngada than in other districts that viewed the village government as being helpful in attempting

Table 11. Village heads' dissemination and villagers' awareness

	Village Head announced Village Programs to general public				Village Head announced Village Funds Use to general public			
	All Obs	Yes	No	Difference	All obs	Yes	No	Difference
Villagers are:								
Aware of village programs	49.2	50.8	44.5	6.3				
Aware of village funds use					11.6	12.1	10.7	1.4
<i>Satisfied with Information from Village Government</i>	43.7	44.4	41.8	2.5	44.9	47.2	40	7.2
Observations	111	83	28		107	73	34	

Notes: all figures are in percentage; ** statistically significant at 5 percent; * statistically significant at 10 percent

Table 12. Top three problems and solutions: views of villagers

	All obs	District					F-test
		Merangin	Batanghari	Banyumas	Wonogiri	Ngada	
Problems/challenges faced by villagers							
Road	43.7	39.2	62.6	47.2	35.8	57.3	5.2 **
- attempts by villagers to address the problem	78.3	56.8	55.6	80.9	83.5	82.3	4.5 **
- attempts by village government to address the problem	73.8	56.4	59.9	74.5	80.5	75.3	2.4 *
- problem resolved/mostly resolved	37.8	28.7	13.2	42.4	39.6	16.0	6.8 **
Crop failure	40.7	41.1	65.4	37.1	39.5	78.0	11.6 **
- attempts by villagers to address the problem	56.5	29.1	39.9	59.7	60.4	70.3	10.1 **
- attempts by village government to address the problem	29.5	15.4	14.6	31.0	28.6	58.1	11.7 **
- problem resolved/mostly resolved	28.4	21.7	5.9	30.9	32.5	21.4	10.9 **
High level of unemployment	32.0	39.5	25.7	37.6	21.5	34.6	2.6 *
- attempts by villagers to address the problem	33.7	20.6	31.2	32.7	43.4	36.1	2.9 **
- attempts by village government to address the problem	18.1	6.0	3.5	18.5	22.9	32.5	25.6 **
- problem resolved/mostly resolved	10.0	3.5	5.7	11.6	9.2	12.9	3.0 **

Notes: all figures are in percentage; ** statistically significant at 5 percent; * statistically significant at 10 percent

to resolve problems. Respondents also felt that programs prepared by the village government were needed, especially in infrastructure. There was almost no disagreement that the programs prepared by village governments were greatly needed (Figure 5).

Ngada also received the most complaints from villagers, which may indicate village government accessibility, aside from the problems that villagers experienced. Overall, about 9 percent of respondents submitted complaints, mostly verbally (Table 13). More men than women complained and more than one-quarter of complaints failed

Figure 5. Perception on importance of village programs




Table 13. Complaint handling by village governments

	All obs	District					F-test
		Merangin	Batanghari	Banyumas	Wonogiri	Ngada	
Complaint and Others							
Submitted complaint/reported problems to village/hamlet, through:	9.0	9.3	4.4	9.9	6.6	23.9	6.5 **
- meetings conducted by village government	17.2	22.8	11.4	13.2	23.0	23.7	1.3
- meetings conducted by hamlet/ward head	30.8	7.8	2.6	30.7	48.9	13.7	8.8 **
- community meetings (routine/special)	2.2	1.3	0.0	1.5	4.3	2.5	2.7 *
- verbally to village/hamlet officials	56.7	82.7	98.1	54.9	40.7	74.6	22.3 **
- protest/demonstration	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.9
Village/Hamlet head response:							
- facilitate problems with the authorities	7.3	13.1	9.5	3.6	10.8	14.9	1.6
- conduct a complaint verification/examination of cases	3.6	11.5	0.0	1.5	4.9	5.8	5.1 **
- deliberate with the community	12.3	12.5	23.1	3.4	31.9	15.1	5.3 **
- dialogue with the parties involved to seek a settlement	6.1	4.8	6.1	5.3	3.4	20.5	0.8
- propose the addition of public facilities to village govt	5.8	7.6	6.4	5.6	5.0	7.7	0.1
- propose to improve road/bridge to facilitate citizen access	16.9	7.0	17.9	17.5	23.5	5.8	3.0 **
- submit complaints/reports of citizens to the village govt	19.2	13.7	26.6	13.3	21.9	55.2	2.9 **
- to bridge the villagers and village govt to direct dialogue	2.2	9.5	0.0	0.4	3.7	2.7	2.2
- NO RESPONSE from village/hamlet	28.6	28.5	30.7	36.3	14.7	14.9	3.6 **
Villagers perception on whether the problem is resolved:							
- fully or mostly resolved	24.5	19.8	5.2	22.8	30.5	28.6	9.4 **
- only a small fraction is resolved	21.5	31.6	42.7	21.3	19.1	13.8	3.0 **
- unresolved	25.4	20.2	21.4	19.6	35.6	42.8	4.9 **
- unresolved, as the problem was not addressed	28.6	28.5	30.7	36.3	14.7	14.9	3.6 **

Notes: all figures are in percentage; ** statistically significant at 5 percent; * statistically significant at 10 percent

to receive a response, with Wonogiri and Ngada having the lowest “no response” rate. The responses included relaying the complaints to higher levels of government, repairing roads (usually) using the village budget, and deliberating with related villagers. It is interesting to note that although Ngada has lower “no response” and “unresolved” (problem was “not addressed”) rates, there are also high percentage of “unresolved” problems. This might indicate that many problems in Ngada are beyond the capacity of village government to handle.

In general, downward accountability mechanisms as stipulated in the Village Law had not been put into practice at the time of the baseline data collection. Village governments only provided reports to the district government (upward accountability) as part of the administrative requirements needed to obtain *Dana Desa* (from the national government) and *Alokasi Dana Desa* (from the district government). Only in Ngada, as shown in the qualitative study, were villages still required to hold accountability meetings in which village heads presented their village implementation reports (LPJ) to the BPD (horizontal accountability). The details of the accountability mechanisms varied across villages. Some meetings allowed villagers to provide comments on the reports while in others they were invited just to listen, as in one of the qualitative study sites (**Box 2**). Survey results show that 39.8 percent of village heads claimed that they had conducted such meetings (compared with 97.2 percent for village planning meetings).

The village government and the BPD then disseminate the village head’s report to the villagers, but more as a “for-your-information-only” activity. Dissemination usually took place in a variety of community gatherings, such as in parties or following prayer meetings. Some questions and discussions did take place, but any follow-up was at the village government’s discretion.

Box 2. Accountability meeting in Ndona Village, Ngada

In Ngada, all villages are required to have a one-day forum annually to discuss the *Laporan Pertanggungjawaban* or LPJ (end-of-year accountability report) and also at the end of the village head’s term. The BPD organizes the forum on any day between December and March. The village head submits his/her report to the BPD at least two weeks before the discussion. The BPD invites all villagers and the *kecamatan* government to hear the village head reporting on all the development activities of the related year, and hear the BPD’s comments/criticisms. Villagers are not allowed to talk (comment), as this is a forum for the BPD to scrutinize the village head’s performance.

This forum provides a window for villagers to observe the state of the relationship between the village head and the BPD. The village head of Ndona said, “The BPD can comment on the LPJ but they cannot reject it, because the report has already been submitted to the Inspectorate previously (and was not rejected). So there is no way for the BPD to reject it. In 2015, the BPD criticized that our own revenues were too small, and that many villagers had not paid their *iuran* (dues) to the *desa*, and I seldom talked to villagers.”

5.4. Role of village activists and the BPD

As discussed earlier, given the challenges or barriers to increasing the number and the range of groups of villagers participating directly in deliberation meetings, this prompted us to look at the potential for making use of other “representatives”. **The formal representatives, i.e., the village council or the BPD, were perceived as less reliable in planning and implementation compared with other leaders, such as village heads and hamlet heads.** Villagers found BPD members to be less reliable in developing and implementing village plans (Table 3). Admittedly, this is not a BPD task as the “legislative branch”, but its involvement in the work of the village government was still not well recognized or understood by villagers.

The qualitative study results confirm that the BPD members were perceived as being less effective than the village government in assisting villagers in resolving village problems. Few villagers considered the BPD to be of great importance or close enough to their constituents.¹³ **The qualitative results also show that the BPD was not yet active in providing**

supervision and demanding accountability from village governments. As the regulation to operationalize the Village Law was not issued until late 2016, we found that the BPD was still operating based on a carry-over from the former law that presented it as a part of the executive branch and allowed the village head to appoint BPD members. BPD members had little knowledge of their role and responsibilities, including providing checks and balances on the village government.

However, when BPD heads were perceived as reliable, villagers tended to participate more in village and hamlet meetings (Annex 1). Also, respected BPD heads (elders) increased villagers’ awareness of village funds use (Table 8). **These findings indicate that strengthening the BPD’s roles and capacity will have a positive impact on governance,** especially in encouraging “demand-side” participation and accountability push.

Village activists also show potential to become villagers’ representatives. Most of these village activists (around 76 percent) were invited to, and attended, village and hamlet meetings (Table 14). Their perceived socioeconomic status was closer to that of the village leadership, placing them

Table 14. Activists’ participation in deliberative meetings

	All obs	Gender		
		Female	Male	Difference
Attended Village meetings	75.6	81.8	73.6	8.2
<i>Observations</i>	222	110	112	
Among those attended meetings:				
- Provided suggestion	90.8	87.1	92.1	-4.9
- Passed judgment	80.3	63.8	86.3	-22.5 **
- Asked about program	66.0	55.1	70.0	-14.9 **
- Asked about program targets	52.8	37.2	58.5	-21.3 **
- Asked about the budget	53.6	43.0	57.4	-14.3 *
- Voted for decision	62.7	63.2	62.5	0.8
<i>Observations</i>	178	91	87	

Notes: Figures are in percentage; ** statistically significant at 5 percent; * statistically significant at 10 percent

Note: Male village activists comprise: religious leaders (48 percent), youth groups (16 percent), the business sector (10 percent); while female village activists comprise: PKK/Dasa Wisma (47 percent), religious leaders (29 percent), businesses (5 percent).

¹³ See Sambodho (a, forthcoming) for more discussions on the capacity gap between the village government (especially the village head) and the BPD.

relatively on a par with the village leadership, although this status also poses risks of perpetuating elite domination. Gender-wise, the difference in participation rates between male and female village activists was not statistically significant. Female village activists were almost as engaged as their male counterparts in meetings, indicating that, unlike non-activist women, they were less reluctant to talk in public forums and were thus better able to help air the voices of their fellow female villagers.¹⁴

Most importantly, these village activists seem to share the general community's concerns over village problems/priority needs. Our survey listed 25 problems for villagers, village and hamlet heads, the BPD and village activists to choose as their top priorities. The most-cited issues by villagers were: access to road, harvest failure and high unemployment (**Table 12**). The responses from the villagers, hamlet heads and village activists showed a significant positive correlation for road and harvest issues (**Table 15**). Village activists did not share similar concerns with villagers on high unemployment. Otherwise, they had similar views on what they considered to be the most urgent village problems.

Table 15. Correlation on problems cited by villagers, village activists and hamlet heads

	Villagers - Activists			Villagers - HHs
	All obs	Female	Male	
Road	0.5024*	0.4374*	0.3494*	0.3074*
Crop failure	0.5592*	0.3504*	0.5235*	0.437*
High level of unemployment	0.1688	0.1222	0.1586	0.3046*

Notes: ** statistically significant at 5 percent; * statistically significant at 10 percent

¹⁴ See Sambodho (b, forthcoming) for more detailed discussions on village activists: their potential and the risks in representing villagers.



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6.

Key Takeaways

Key Takeaways

Deliberative meetings (e.g., to discuss annual plans, or the budget and accountability reports) at the village level are not an inclusive process. Less than half village heads made any effort to invite villagers to attend such meetings. When they did, village governments decided who to invite. From the villagers' perspective, the probability of receiving an invitation to these meetings depended on the individual and his/her household's characteristics. Women and those in the bottom 40 percent of the welfare distribution were less likely to receive an invitation. Conversely, those with higher educational attainment, those actively involved in local organizations and/or political parties, concerned villagers (i.e., those having raised issues or complaints previously) and those who viewed the village head positively were more likely to be invited.

However, not being invited is not the main reason that villagers do not go to meetings. More than half of all villagers did not attend meetings regardless of being invited, indicating that the meetings were unpopular. Villagers considered the meetings not to be their concern and that they were the business of village leaders, while villagers also assumed that they were already being represented by their hamlet/neighborhood and community leaders. In addition, attending meetings imposed social and financial costs on villagers, taking them away from their work and domestic chores, particularly for women.

Villagers' views of village leadership (village government and the BPD) and their previous experience also influence their participation in meetings and awareness of information. Village heads who had been in office for three years or more had a positive influence, as did village heads and their staff who had previous experience of CDD projects (i.e., PNPM). In addition, BPD heads who were perceived as reliable and respected by villagers also had a positive impact.

Similar to participation at village meetings, villagers do not seem to be interested in information about the use of funds or development plans in their

villages. About one-third of villagers stated outright that they had no interest in any village-related information. They were interested in information that directly and immediately impacted them, such as information on aid programs and project implementation when they might be expected to work. Village heads concurred and shared the same interests in disseminating such information.

In contrast to village-level meetings, hamlet meetings are more popular. These meetings had a higher attendance rate and were also more inclusive. Participants came from different social groups. The level of welfare of participants did not seem to influence their attendance, nor did distance. More villagers viewed hamlet heads positively and villagers also knew more information about project activities in their own hamlets. In some areas in Java, meetings might even begin at neighborhood/ward levels due to the large population size of the villages.

While villagers appear not to be interested in village meetings, most village activists (over 75 percent) attend these meetings. These village activists generally belonged to the same socioeconomic status as other village leadership members, making their interaction relatively easy. The village activists' issues of concern were largely similar to those of most villagers. In addition, there was less difference in the level of engagement in village discussions between female and male activists compared with non-activists, suggesting their potential in representing the villagers, both men and women.

Finally, district policy appears to influence the level of villagers' participation. Ngada consistently showed a higher level of participation and awareness of village affairs and information. The district had its own CDD-type of projects, mirroring PNPM. Similarly, at the sub-village level there was a long tradition of regular community gatherings in Wonogiri, which increased participation at hamlet meetings, making Wonogiri second to Ngada. Regular prayer meetings often served as a forum for sub-village level discussions. Where these good practices will lead is a point of considerable interest to observe in the remainder of the study.



7.

Looking Forward

Looking Forward

Improving representation is a much-needed step, given the faltering levels of public participation.

Direct public participation across all groups, including poor and marginalized groups, may not be realistic, given the constraints these groups face, ranging from particularly high opportunity costs, limited access to related information and knowledge, and gender bias as often occurs in patriarchal communities. Indirect participation or participation by representation should therefore be strengthened in tandem with direct participation, especially by women and the poor. For this reason, the BPD, which was largely disregarded at the start of VL implementation, should be strengthened in the spirit of the VL. However, as this report shows, village activists are also an alternative, and potentially more effective, source for strengthening the community's representatives. There are legitimate concerns that figures such as village activists may have interests that are closer to the village government's and not attuned to those of the general villagers. Despite this risk, a recent study in Zimbabwe shows that figures such as the health workers, school committee members and leaders of farmers' groups, when their capacity was improved, turned out to be able to exert horizontal pressure to counter the village government (Baldwin, Muyengwa & Mvukiyehe, 2017). The study cites several reasons why this approach works: the long tradition of having countervailing elites acting against the community chiefs, and community leaders who are generally young and less partisan, and who are also likely to benefit themselves from reforms.

Strengthening more community figures will also expand checks and balances outside the formal institutions. Village councils and activists can serve as a countervailing power to the village government. The last round of the LLI study in Indonesia shows that democratic elections improved village governance—that village heads are more likely to work in the villagers' interests, and maintain participatory and transparency norms. However, the same study also shows that when countervailing

power to check the village government is absent (weakened village councils and customary leaders) between elections, abuses are more likely (Wetterberg et al., 2014).

Hamlet deliberation meetings need to be strengthened as the primary locus of public participation. Villagers were more involved in planning discussions at the hamlet level. Socioeconomic status was less of a barrier here and their knowledge of development in their own hamlet was also higher than of their village. If village activists and the BPD represent villagers or their constituents at village-level discussions, villagers can then focus on hamlet discussions, particularly during the development of the mid-term plan (RPJM Desa). The annual plan, derived from the RPJM Desa, need not be discussed as extensively, unless there are new proposals of unforeseen urgency. Meanwhile, the representatives should be more involved at these village-level discussions. However, it remains important for these representatives to report back to villagers later at their hamlet meetings.

Improving ways of communicating village development activities and finances are key in ensuring that villagers are provided with opportunities/channels to seek out such information and, at the same time, to raise the community's awareness of the "publicness" of funds that are managed by the village government. Villagers showed limited interest in the management of village funds, and tended to assume that this was the business of the village government and did not involve them. The BPD and village activists, in particular, could all play a more active role in finding the best channels to communicate information and in ensuring information can be accessed as and when needed. With the new regulation on the BPD (Permendagri No. 110/2016), it will be important to begin concerted efforts to improve the BPD's capacity to supervise village governments and ensure that downward accountability occurs. At the same time, capacity building should also be provided to village activists, strengthening them while also not weakening or neglecting capacity building in village government institutions.

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Annex 1. Characteristics of invitees and non-invitees, and their attendance at village meetings

Characteristics	All respondents			Respondents who are invited			Respondents who are not invited		
	All respondents	Invited	Not invited	All respondents	Attended	Did not attend	All respondents	Attended	Did not attend
Individual									
Female	51.8	52.2	51.6	52.2	37.5	59.6	51.6	52.7	51.6
Age (years)	47.0	47.8	46.6	47.8	46.1	48.6	46.6	46.4	46.6
No formal education	24.5	20.3	27.1	20.3	12.0	24.5	27.1	21.8	27.4
Completed Primary	38.9	37.3	39.9	37.3	36.8	37.6	39.9	36	40.1
Completed Junior Secondary	17.4	18.7	16.6	18.7	18.4	18.9	16.6	23.8	16.2
Completed Senior Secondary and beyond	19.2	23.7	16.4	23.7	32.9	19.0	16.4	18.4	16.3
Currently working	76.1	76.6	75.8	76.6	82.5	73.6	75.8	79.8	75.6
Belongs to ethnic majority group	92.5	94.2	91.4	94.2	89.9	96.4	91.4	94	91.3
Belongs to religion majority group	98.7	99.0	98.5	99.0	99.3	98.9	98.5	100	98.5
# yrs resides in village (years)	36.5	37.4	36.0	37.4	35.8	38.2	36	34.7	36
Active in local organization	87.0	89.0	85.8	89.0	96.1	85.4	85.8	91.4	85.5
Active in political party	5.1	6.1	4.6	6.1	11.0	3.5	4.6	10.4	4.3
Household									
Household headed by female	9.8	10.1	9.7	10.1	5.8	12.3	9.7	3.8	10
Bottom-40	38.9	36.1	40.6	36.1	31.5	38.4	40.6	32.3	41
Distance to Village Head Office (km)	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.9	0.9	1	0.9
Village Head resides in hamlet	27.1	29.2	25.8	29.2	31.3	28.1	25.8	26.8	25.7
Village apparatus reside in hamlet	78.7	75.6	80.5	75.6	84.0	71.4	80.5	70.5	81
Opinions and perception									
Submitted complains or reported problems	9	11.9	7.2	11.9	23.9	5.8	7.2	19.8	6.6
Village Head is reliable in planning	74.9	79.3	72.2	79.3	76.8	80.5	72.2	86.8	71.5
Hamlet Head is reliable in planning	78.5	81.0	76.9	81.0	75.6	83.8	76.9	81.2	76.6
BPD Head is reliable in planning	58.3	65.2	54.1	65.2	74.0	60.7	54.1	67.4	53.5
Village Head is reliable in implementation	77.5	80.5	75.7	80.5	79.4	81.1	75.7	87.2	75.1
Hamlet Head is reliable in implementation	80.8	83.4	79.2	83.4	79.3	85.5	79.2	85.9	78.8
BPD Head is reliable in implementation	59	65.1	55.2	65.1	74.7	60.2	55.2	65.2	54.7
Observations	4,081	1,691	2,390	1,691	835	856	2,390	158	2,232

Notes: all figures are in percentage unless otherwise stated; ** statistically significant at 5 percent; * statistically significant at 10 percent

Annex 2. Village and hamlet meeting attendees and non-attendees

Characteristics	All respondents			Village meetings			Hamlet meetings		
	All respondents	Attended	Did not attend	All respondents	Attended	Did not attend	All respondents	Attended	Did not attend
Individual									
Female	51.8	40.3	54.0	-13.7 **	40.4	56.0	-15.6 **		
Age (years)	47.0	46.2	47.2	-1.0	48.6	46.4	2.2 **		
No formal education	24.5	13.8	26.5	-12.7 **	23.9	24.7	-0.8		
Completed Primary	38.9	36.7	39.4	-2.7	37.0	39.6	-2.7		
Completed Junior Secondary	17.4	19.3	17.0	2.3	17.6	17.3	0.3		
Completed Senior Secondary and beyond	19.2	30.2	17.1	13.1 **	21.5	18.3	3.2		
Currently working	76.1	82.0	75.0	7.0 **	86.0	72.5	13.6 **		
Belongs to ethnic majority group	92.5	90.7	92.8	-2.1	95.9	91.2	4.7 **		
Belongs to religion majority group	98.7	99.4	98.6	0.8 *	98.4	98.9	-0.5		
# yrs resides in village (years)	36.5	35.6	36.7	-1.1	38.3	35.9	2.4 **		
Active in local organization	87.0	95.3	85.5	9.8 **	96.5	83.6	12.9 **		
Active in political party	5.1	10.9	4.1	6.9 **	4.7	5.3	-0.7		
Household									
Household headed by female	9.8	5.5	10.7	-5.2 **	6.3	11.1	-4.9 **		
Bottom-40	38.9	31.6	40.2	-8.6 **	36.1	39.9	-3.8		
Distance to Village Head Office (km)	0.8	0.8	0.9	-0.1	1.1	0.8	0.3 **		
Village Head resides in hamlet	27.1	30.5	26.4	4.0	16.9	30.8	-13.9 **		
Village apparatus reside in hamlet	78.7	81.5	78.1	3.4	67.3	82.8	-15.5 **		
Opinions and perception									
Submitted complains or reported problems	9.0	23.1	6.4	16.7 **	13.6	7.3	6.3 **		
Village Head is reliable in planning	74.9	78.7	74.2	4.5 **	80.5	72.8	7.7 **		
Hamlet Head is reliable in planning	78.5	76.7	78.8	-2.1	83.5	76.6	6.9 **		
BPD Head is reliable in planning	58.3	72.8	55.6	17.2 **	66.5	55.4	11.1 **		
Village Head is reliable in implementation	77.5	80.8	76.9	3.9 *	83.1	75.5	7.6 **		
Hamlet Head is reliable in implementation	80.8	80.5	80.8	-0.3	85.6	79.0	6.6 **		
BPD Head is reliable in implementation	59.0	72.9	56.4	16.6 **	68.2	55.6	12.6 **		
Observations	4,081	993	3,088		1,274	2,807			

Notes: all figures are in percentage unless otherwise stated; ** statistically significant at 5 percent; * statistically significant at 10 percent

Annex 3. Cited reasons for non-attendance and probable conditions for future attendance

Characteristics	Reasons for not attending village meetings						Will attend future village meetings if					
	All respondents		Not invited		Busy		Irrelevant/already represented		Invited		Meetings are made mandatory	
	Cited	Not cited	Cited	Difference	Cited	Not cited	Difference	Cited	Not cited	Cited	Not cited	Difference
Individual												
Female	54.0	51.6	58.3	-8.1 **	53.1	52.8	7.1 **	51.3	62.6	60.1	53.2	6.9 **
Age (years)	47.2	46.6	45.4	-2.2 **	47.6	47.1	0.3	46.8	48.6	50.3	46.8	3.5 **
No formal education	26.5	27.4	21.8	2.8	27.5	27.3	-4.4	26.1	28.0	29.3	26.2	3.2
Completed Primary	39.4	40.1	33.6	2.6	40.5	38.1	7.2 **	40.5	35.8	35.7	39.8	-4.1
Completed Junior Secondary	17.0	16.2	18.9	-2.7	16.5	17.6	0.7	16.6	18.4	17.4	17.0	0.4
Completed Senior Secondary and beyond	17.1	16.3	19.0	-2.7	15.5	14.3	3.4	16.9	17.8	17.6	17.1	0.5
Currently working	75.0	75.6	73.6	2.1	81.4	73.7	7.7 **	73.6	69.4	63.9	76.4	-12.5 **
Belongs to ethnic majority group	92.8	91.3	96.4	-5.0 **	94.0	92.6	1.4	92.2	97.4	94.5	92.6	1.9
Belongs to religion majority group	98.6	98.5	98.9	-0.5	98.3	98.7	-0.4	99.6	98.7	98.6	98.6	-0.1
# yrs resides in village (years)	36.7	36.0	38.2	-2.2 *	37.4	37.3	0.8	37.3	38.4	40.9	36.1	4.8 **
Active in local organization	85.5	85.5	85.4	0.1	81.0	86.4	-5.4 **	89.2	83.1	82.9	85.8	-3.0
Active in political party	4.1	4.3	3.5	0.8	4.1	2.7	4.4	4.2	3.7	6.4	3.8	2.6
Household												
Household headed by female	10.7	10.0	12.3	-2.3	9.1	11.0	-1.9	12.6	10.3	11.6	10.6	0.4
Bottom-40	40.2	41.0	38.4	2.6	33.7	41.6	-7.9 **	42.4	39.8	43.3	40.1	1.3
Distance to Village Head Office (km)	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.0	0.7	0.9	-0.2 *	0.8	1.0	0.8	0.9	0.0
Village Head resides in hamlet	26.4	25.7	28.1	-2.4	31.6	26.9	6.3	26.9	29.5	26.2	26.5	-0.2
Village apparatus reside in hamlet	78.1	81.0	71.4	9.6 **	78.8	74.1	79.0	74.1	71.6	78.8	78.0	0.8
Opinions and perception												
Submitted complains or reported problems	6.4	6.6	5.8	0.8	6.4	6.6	0.3	6.6	5.8	8.3	6.1	2.2
Village Head is reliable in planning	74.2	71.5	80.5	-9.0 **	79.8	73.0	6.8 **	76.0	77.9	71.8	74.5	-2.7
Hamlet Head is reliable in planning	78.8	76.6	83.8	-7.1 **	81.1	83.6	77.8	83.6	79.0	76.7	79.1	-2.4
BPD Head is reliable in planning	55.6	53.5	60.7	-7.2 *	61.0	59.4	4.6 *	55.5	55.9	53.6	55.9	-2.3
Village Head is reliable in implementation	76.9	75.1	81.1	-6.0 **	79.8	76.3	3.5	79.0	78.5	73.8	77.3	-3.5
Hamlet Head is reliable in implementation	80.8	78.8	85.5	-6.7 **	84.1	84.5	80.1	84.5	82.0	81.7	80.7	1.0
BPD Head is reliable in implementation	56.4	54.7	60.2	-5.5	60.4	59.2	55.8	59.2	56.1	56.4	56.3	0.4
Observations	3,088	2,232	856	496	2,592	651	2,437	2,418	670	379	2,709	

Notes: all figures are in percentage unless otherwise stated; ** statistically significant at 5 percent; * statistically significant at 10 percent

Annex 4. Probit estimates of attending village meetings (marginal effects)

	All Observations		Women		Men	
	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE
Individual						
Woman	-0.051	(0.014) **				
Age	0.007	(0.004) *	0.008	(0.004) *	0.011	(0.006) *
Age^2	0.000	(0.000) **	0.000	(0.000) **	0.000	(0.000) *
Completed Primary	0.044	(0.021) *	0.013	(0.027)	0.066	(0.029) **
Completed Junior Secondary	0.099	(0.029) **	0.065	(0.037) *	0.115	(0.044) **
Completed Senior Secondary and beyond	0.127	(0.028) **	0.043	(0.037)	0.193	(0.039) **
Work	0.007	(0.017)	0.014	(0.015)	-0.011	(0.044)
Belongs to major ethnic group	0.017	(0.024)	0.027	(0.026)	0.004	(0.037)
Belongs to major religion group	0.111	(0.072)	0.111	(0.072)	0.112	(0.118)
#yrs residing in village	0.001	(0.001)	0.000	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)
Active in local organization	0.126	(0.028) **	0.113	(0.045) **	0.142	(0.039) **
Active in political party	0.081	(0.022) **	0.090	(0.054)	0.090	(0.025) **
Household						
Female-headed household	-0.058	(0.020) **	-0.038	(0.025)	-0.090	(0.071)
HH members aged 0-4	-0.026	(0.015) *	-0.050	(0.019) **	0.000	(0.020)
HH members aged 5-14	-0.013	(0.009)	-0.014	(0.012)	-0.018	(0.013)
HH members aged 60+	-0.002	(0.012)	-0.002	(0.016)	0.003	(0.015)
Welfare	0.012	(0.005) **	0.010	(0.006)	0.016	(0.008) *
Welfare^2	0.001	(0.003)	0.000	(0.002)	0.002	(0.004)
Distance to Village Head Office	0.002	(0.007)	0.001	(0.011)	0.002	(0.008)
Enabling environment						
Village Head formerly PNPM actor	0.009	(0.025)	-0.007	(0.025)	0.028	(0.035)
BPD Head formerly PNPM actor	0.007	(0.018)	0.007	(0.021)	0.010	(0.023)
Local Activists formerly PNPM actor	0.004	(0.032)	-0.027	(0.036)	0.038	(0.050)
Presence of PD/PLD	0.029	(0.028)	0.019	(0.028)	0.038	(0.036)
Observations	4,081		2,125		1,956	

Note: Probit specifications also control for kabupaten, but not shown; ** statistically significant at 5 percent; * statistically significant at 10 percent

Annex 5. Respondents' characteristics by their awareness of last year's village program and fund use

Characteristics	All respondents	Village programs			Village funds use		
		Aware	Not aware	Difference	Aware	Not aware	Difference
Individual							
Female	51.8	42.2	60.6	-18.4 **	36.2	53.6	-17.5 **
Age (years)	47.0	46.6	47.4	-0.9	46.6	47.1	-0.5
No formal education	24.5	19.0	29.6	-10.6 **	11.3	26.0	-14.7 **
Completed Primary	38.9	40.5	37.5	3.0	35.1	39.4	-4.2
Completed Junior Secondary	17.4	18.4	16.5	2.0	23.9	16.6	7.2 **
Completed Senior Secondary and beyond	19.2	22.2	16.4	5.7 **	29.7	18.0	11.7 **
Currently working	76.1	79.1	73.4	5.7 **	81.9	75.4	6.4 *
Belongs to ethnic majority group	92.5	94.4	90.7	3.7 **	97.5	91.9	5.6 **
Belongs to religion majority group	98.7	98.7	98.8	-0.1	97.2	98.9	-1.8
# yrs resides in village (years)	36.5	36.4	36.6	-0.2	35.4	36.6	-1.2
Active in local organization	87.0	93.0	81.6	11.4 **	96.1	86.0	10.1 **
Active in political party	5.1	7.6	2.9	4.8 **	12.0	4.4	7.6 **
Household							
Household headed by female	9.8	9.2	10.4	-1.2	9.5	9.9	-0.4
Bottom-40	38.9	35.1	42.3	-7.3 **	26.2	40.3	-14.1 **
Distance to Village Head Office (km)	0.8	0.8	0.9	-0.1 **	0.9	0.8	0.0
Village Head resides in hamlet	27.1	27.7	26.5	1.2	27.2	27.1	0.2
Village apparatus reside in hamlet	78.7	78.9	78.4	0.5	75.1	79.1	-4.0
Opinions and perception							
Submitted complains or reported problems	9.0	13.7	4.8	8.9 **	25.5	7.1	18.4 **
Village Head is reliable in planning	74.9	79.3	70.8	8.5 **	81.7	74.1	7.6 **
Hamlet Head is reliable in planning	78.5	80.1	77.0	3.1	83.4	77.9	5.5
BPD Head is reliable in planning	58.3	65.7	51.6	14.1 **	77.2	56.2	21.0 **
Village Head is reliable in implementation	77.5	81.4	73.9	7.5 **	82.0	77.0	5.0 *
Hamlet Head is reliable in implementation	80.8	83.3	78.5	4.8 **	83.4	80.5	2.9
BPD Head is reliable in implementation	59.0	66.6	51.9	14.7 **	77.5	56.8	20.7 **
Observations	4,081	1,919	2,162		446	3,635	

Notes: all figures are in percentage unless otherwise stated; ** statistically significant at 5 percent; * statistically significant at 10 percent

Annex 6. Desire to know village information

Characteristics	All respondents	Wants to know	Does not want to know	Difference
Individual				
Female	51.8	47.2	60.0	-12.77 **
Age (years)	47.0	45.1	50.4	-5.36 **
No formal education	24.5	20.5	31.5	-10.98 **
Completed Primary	38.9	37.9	40.7	-2.84
Completed Junior Secondary	17.4	18.7	15.1	3.62
Completed Senior Secondary and beyond	19.2	22.9	12.7	10.19 **
Currently working	76.1	76.6	75.3	1.24
Belongs to ethnic majority group	92.5	92.0	93.4	-1.42
Belongs to religion majority group	98.7	99.1	98.1	1.07 **
# yrs resides in village (years)	36.5	34.5	40.0	-5.45 **
Active in local organization	87.0	88.8	84.0	4.81 **
Active in political party	5.1	6.5	2.7	3.78 **
Household				
Household headed by female	9.8	8.7	11.9	-3.21 **
Bottom-40	38.9	39.3	38.1	1.19
Distance to Village Head Office (km)	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.09
Village Head resides in hamlet	27.1	30.1	21.8	8.34 **
Village apparatus reside in hamlet	78.7	81.5	73.6	7.91 **
Opinions and perception				
Attended village meetings	15.7	20.3	7.7	12.60 **
Attended hamlet meetings	26.7	28.0	24.4	3.65
Submitted complains or reported problems	9.0	12.9	2.3	10.61 **
Village Head is reliable in planning	74.9	72.7	78.6	-5.86 **
Hamlet Head is reliable in planning	78.5	76.9	81.1	-4.21 **
BPD Head is reliable in planning	58.3	61.6	52.6	9.02 **
Village Head is reliable in implementation	80.8	79.5	83.0	-3.45 *
Hamlet Head is reliable in implementation	77.5	75.4	81.2	-5.82 **
BPD Head is reliable in implementation	59.0	62.3	53.1	9.27 **
<i>Observations</i>	<i>4,081</i>	<i>2,757</i>	<i>1,324</i>	

Notes: all figures are in percentage unless otherwise stated; ** statistically significant at 5 percent;

Annex 7. Sampling Weight Approach

Based on the sampling methodology described in Section 3.2, we can then construct sampling plan tables and sampling design weight for each sampling units.

1. Sampling weight for an individual data

Sampling plan table for person selection and sampling weight for person data are described below.

Annex Table 7.1. Sampling scheme table for persons selection in each selected district-*i*th

Stage	Sampling unit	Stratum	Universe	Sample	Sampling	Weight
1	Sub-district (A, j)	-	A_i	a_i	Random	$\frac{A_i}{a_i}$
2	Village (B, k)	-	B_{ij}	$b_{ij} = 4$	Random	$\frac{B_{ij}}{b_{ij}} = \frac{B_{ij}}{4}$
3	Hamlet (C, l)	-	C_{ijk}	$c_{ijk} = 1$	Random	$\frac{C_{ijk}}{c_{ijk}} = \frac{C_{ijk}}{1}$
4	Household (D, m)	-	D_{ijkl}	$d_{ijkl} = 20$	Random	$\frac{D_{ijkl}}{d_{ijkl}} = \frac{D_{ijkl}}{20}$
5	Person (E, n)	Gender:				
		Male (1)	$E_{ijklm}^{(m)}$	$e_{ijklm}^{(m)} = 1$	Stratified Random	$\frac{E_{ijklm}^{(m)}}{e_{ijklm}^{(m)}} = \frac{E_{ijklm}^{(m)}}{1}$
		Female (2)	$E_{ijklm}^{(f)}$	$e_{ijklm}^{(f)} = 1$		$\frac{E_{ijklm}^{(f)}}{e_{ijklm}^{(f)}} = \frac{E_{ijklm}^{(f)}}{1}$

Based on the sampling plan table above, the sex-specific sampling weight can be calculated.

Weight for male respondents:

$$w_{ijklm}^{(m)} = \prod_{s=1}^5 w_{ijklm}^{(m;s)} = \frac{A_i}{a_i} \times \frac{B_{ij}}{4} \times C_{ijk} \times \frac{D_{ijkl}}{20} \times E_{ijklm}^{(m)} = \frac{A_i B_{ij} C_{ijk} D_{ijkl} E_{ijklm}^{(m)}}{80 a_i}$$

where,

- $w_{ijklm}^{(m)}$ is male weight in selected household-m, selected hamlet-l, selected village-k, selected sub-district-j, and selected district-i,
- A_i is number of sub-districts in selected district-i,
- a_i is number of selected sub-districts in selected district-i,
- B_{ij} is number of villages in selected sub-district-j and selected district-i,
- b_{ij} is number of selected villages in selected sub-district-j and selected district-i, $b_{ij} = 4$
- C_{ijk} is number of hamlets in selected village-k, selected sub-district-j, and selected district-i,
- c_{ijk} is number of selected hamlets in selected village-k, selected sub-district-j, and selected district-i, $c_{ijk} = 1$

- D_{ijkl} is number of households in selected hamlet-l, selected village-k, selected subdistrict-j, and selected district-i,
- d_{ijkl} is number of selected households in selected hamlet-l, selected village-k, selected sub-district-j, and selected district-i, $d_{ijkl} = 20$
- $E_{ijklm}^{(m)}$ is number of males in selected household-m, selected hamlet-l, selected village-k, selected sub-district-j, and selected district-i,
- $e_{ijklm}^{(m)}$ is number of selected s in selected household-m, selected hamlet-l, selected villagek, selected sub-district-j, and selected district-i, $e_{ijklm}^{(m)} = 1$

Weight for female respondents:

$$w_{ijklm}^{(f)} = \prod_{s=1}^5 w_{ijklm}^{(f;s)} = \frac{A_i}{a_i} \times \frac{B_{ij}}{4} \times C_{ijk} \times \frac{D_{ijkl}}{20} \times E_{ijklm}^{(f)} = \frac{A_i B_{ij} C_{ijk} D_{ijkl} E_{ijklm}^{(f)}}{80 a_i}$$


where,

- $w_{ijklm}^{(f)}$ is female weight in selected household-m, selected hamlet-l, selected village-k, selected sub-district-j, and selected district-i,
- $E_{ijklm}^{(f)}$ is number of females in selected household-m, selected hamlet-l, selected village-k, selected sub-district-j, and selected district-i,
- $e_{ijklm}^{(f)}$ is number of selected females in selected household-m, selected hamlet-l, selected village-k, selected sub-district-j, and selected district-i, $e_{ijklm}^{(f)} = 1$

The sampling design weight at enumeration area (ea) level are depicted in **Annex 7.1**.

Annex Figure 7.1.

Design and Trimmed Weight - EA level




The variation of design weight is relatively high and this can cause the higher standard error and wider interval estimates. Trimming weight will reduce the standard error but may cause the bias depends upon the number of weights are truncated. The cut-off value is based on the mean and the standard deviation of sampling weights. The graph above depicts the plot of sampling design weights and trimmed weights for each ea with 4 different value of cut-off. Panel A depicts the weight plot with the cut-off value of Mean+SD, while Panel B is Mean+1.5xSD, Panel C is Mean+1.8xSD, and Panel D is Mean+2xSD. The Panel A shows that some trimmed weights are still higher than the cut-off value and the proportion of weight that are trimmed is higher compared to the other cut-off value, as well as Panels B and C. Based on these plots, the best option is the cut-off value of Mean+2xSD (Panel D) because all trimmed weights are below the cut-off value and the smallest proportion of weight that are trimmed.

The same evaluation is done when we calculate the person weights. For male weight, we pick the cut-off value of Mean+2.7xSD and for female weight is Mean+2.0xSD to give the best truncated sex-specific weights for person data. **Annex Figure 7.2.**

Annex Figure 7.2.

Design and Trimmed Weight - Person data



2. Sampling weight for household data

Sampling plan table for household selection and sampling weight for household data are described below.

Annex Table 7.2. Sampling scheme table for household selection in each selected district-*i*th

Stage	Sampling unit	Stratum	Universe	Sample	Sampling	Weight
1	Sub-district (A, j)	-	A_i	a_i	Random	$\frac{A_i}{a_i}$
2	Village (B, k)	-	B_{ij}	$b_{ij} = 4$	Random	$\frac{B_{ij}}{b_{ij}} = \frac{B_{ij}}{4}$
3	Hamlet (C, l)	-	C_{ijk}	$c_{ijk} = 1$	Random	$\frac{C_{ijk}}{c_{ijk}} = \frac{C_{ijk}}{1}$
4	Household (D, m)	-	D_{ijkl}	$d_{ijkl} = 20$	Random	$\frac{D_{ijkl}}{d_{ijkl}} = \frac{D_{ijkl}}{20}$

Weight for household respondents:

$$w_{ijkl} = \prod_{s=1}^4 w_{ijkl}^{(s)} = \frac{A_i}{a_i} \times \frac{B_{ij}}{4} \times C_{ijk} \times \frac{D_{ijkl}}{20} = \frac{A_i B_{ij} C_{ijk} D_{ijkl}}{80 a_i}$$


where,

w_{ijkl} is household weight in selected hamlet-l, selected village-k, selected sub-district-j, and selected district-i.

Annex Figure 7.3. depicts the plot of sampling design weights and trimmed weights of selected household in each selected ea with 4 different value of cut-off. Panel A depicts the weight plot with the cut-off value of Mean+SD, while Panel B is Mean+1.5xSD, Panel C is Mean+1.8xSD, and Panel D is Mean+2xSD. The Panel A, B, and C show that some trimmed weights are still higher than the cut-off value and the proportion of weight that are trimmed is higher compared to the other cut-off value. Based on these plots, the best option is the cut-off value of Mean+2xSD (Panel D).

Annex Figure 7.3.

Design and Trimmed Weight - Household data



3. Sampling weight for hamlet leader data

Sampling plan table for hamlet leader selection and sampling weight for hamlet leader data are described below.

Annex Table 7.3. Sampling scheme table for hamlet leader selection in each selected district-*j*th

Stage	Sampling unit	Stratum	Universe	Sample	Sampling	Weight
1	Sub-district (A, j)	-			Random	
2	Village (B, k)	-			Random	
3	Hamlet (C, l)	-			Random	

Weight for hamlet leader respondents:

$$w_{ijk} = \prod_{s=1}^3 w_{ijk}^{(s)} = \frac{A_i}{a_i} \times \frac{B_{ij}}{4} \times C_{ijk} = \frac{A_i B_{ij} C_{ijk}}{4a_i}$$


where,

w_{ijk} is hamlet leader weight in selected village-k, selected sub-district-j, and selected district-i.

Annex Figure 7.4. depicts the plot of sampling design weights and trimmed weights of selected hamlet leader in each selected ea with 4 different value of cut-off. Panel A depicts the weight plot with the cut-off value of Mean+0.8xSD, while Panel B is Mean+SD, Panel C is Mean+1.25xSD, and Panel D is Mean+1.5xSD. The Panels A, B, C show that some trimmed weights are still higher than the cut-off value and the proportion of weight that are trimmed is higher compared to the other cut-off value. Based on these plots, the best option is the cut-off value of Mean+1.5xSD (Panel D).

Annex Figure 7.4.

Design and Trimmed Weight - Hamlet leader data



4. Sampling weight for activist data

Sampling plan table for male and female activist selection and sampling weight for male and female activist data are described below.

Annex Table 7.4. Sampling scheme table for activist selection in each selected district-*i*th

Stage	Sampling unit	Stratum	Universe	Sample	Sampling	Weight	
1	Sub-district (A, j)	-	A_i	a_i	Random	$\frac{A_i}{a_i}$	
2	Village (B, k)	-	B_{ij}	$b_{ij} = 4$	Random	$\frac{B_{ij}}{b_{ij}} = \frac{B_{ij}}{4}$	
3	Activist (F, l)	Gender:					
		Male (m)	$F_{ijk}^{(m)}$	$f_{ijk}^{(m)} = 1$	Stratified PPS, size=# voters	$\frac{V_{ijk}^{(m)}}{f_{ijk}^{(m)} V_{ijkl}^{(m)}} = \frac{V_{ijk}^{(m)}}{V_{ijkl}^{(m)}}$	
		Female (f)	$F_{ijk}^{(f)}$	$f_{ijk}^{(f)} = 1$		$\frac{V_{ijk}^{(f)}}{f_{ijk}^{(f)} V_{ijkl}^{(f)}} = \frac{V_{ijk}^{(f)}}{V_{ijkl}^{(f)}}$	

Weight for male activist:

$$w_{ijkl}^{(m)} = \prod_{s=1}^3 w_{ijkl}^{(m;s)} = \frac{A_i}{a_i} \times \frac{B_{ij}}{4} \times \frac{V_{ijk}^{(m)}}{V_{ijkl}^{(m)}} = \frac{A_i B_{ij} V_{ijk}^{(m)}}{4 a_i V_{ijkl}^{(m)}}$$

where,

$w_{ijkl}^{(m)}$ is weight for male activist-l in selected village-k, selected sub-district-j, and selected district-i,

$F_{ijk}^{(m)}$ is number of male activists in selected village-k, selected sub-district-j, and selected district-i,

$f_{ijk}^{(m)}$ is number of selected male activists in selected village-k, selected sub-district-j, and selected district-i,

$V_{ijkl}^{(m)}$ is number of voters for selected male activist-l in selected village-k, selected subdistrict-j, and selected district-i,

$V_{ijk}^{(m)}$ is total number of voters of male activists in selected village-k, selected sub-district-j, and selected district-i, $V_{ijk}^{(m)} = \sum_{\forall l} V_{ijkl}^{(m)}$.

Weight for female activist:

$$w_{ijkl}^{(f)} = \prod_{s=1}^3 w_{ijkl}^{(f;s)} = \frac{A_i}{a_i} \times \frac{B_{ij}}{4} \times \frac{V_{ijk}^{(f)}}{V_{ijkl}^{(f)}} = \frac{A_i B_{ij} V_{ijk}^{(f)}}{4 a_i V_{ijkl}^{(f)}}$$

where,

$w_{ijkl}^{(f)}$ is weight for female activist-l in selected village-k, selected sub-district-j, and selected district-i,

$F_{ijk}^{(f)}$ is number of female activists in selected village-k, selected sub-district-j, and selected district-i,

$f_{ijk}^{(f)}$ is number of selected female activists in selected village-k, selected sub-district-j, and selected district-i,


$V_{ijkl}^{(f)}$ is number of voters for selected female activist-l in selected village-k, selected subdistrict-j, and selected district-i,

$V_{ijk}^{(f)}$ is total number of voters of female activists in selected village-k, selected sub-districtj, and selected district-i, $V_{ijk}^{(f)} = \sum_{l} V_{ijkl}^{(f)}$.

Annex Figure 7.5. depicts the plot of sampling design weights and trimmed weights of selected activist in each selected ea with the best option of cut-off value for male and female activists. The cut-off value for male activist weight is Mean+1.7xSD, while for female activist weight is Mean+1.6xSD. Panel C shows the plot of design and trimmed weight of male and female activist samples and Panel D shows the male to female activist weight ratio. The ratios are very similar comparing design and trimmed weight.

Annex Figure 7.5.

Design and Trimmed Weight - Activist data



5. Sampling weight for village and BPD leader data

Sampling plan table for village and BPD leader selection and sampling weight for village and BPD leader data are described below.

Annex Table 7.5. Sampling scheme table for village and BPD leader selection in each selected district-*i*th

Stage	Sampling unit	Stratum	Universe	Sample	Sampling	Weight
1	Sub-district (A, j)	-	A_i	a_i	Random	$\frac{A_i}{a_i}$
2	Village (B, k)	-	B_{ij}	$b_{ij} = 4$	Random	$\frac{B_{ij}}{b_{ij}} = \frac{B_{ij}}{4}$

Weight for village and BPD leader respondents:

$$w_{ij} = \prod_{s=1}^2 w_{ij}^{(s)} = \frac{A_i}{a_i} \times \frac{B_{ij}}{4} = \frac{A_i B_{ij}}{4a_i}$$

where,

w_{ij} is weight for village or BPD leader of selected village-k in selected sub-district-j, and selected district-i,

Annex Figure 7.6. shows the weight for village and BPD leader data. There is no extremely high weight that may increase the standard error of estimates, therefore the design weight does not to be trimmed.

Annex Figure 7.6.

Design weight - Village and BPD leader data

